Make use of OWASP Mobile Top 10

February 14, 2017

OWASP “Mobile Security Project” team updated their Mobile Top 10 Vulnerability list this week. {in the process they broke some of their links, if you hit one, just use the 2015 content for now:}

I was in a meeting yesterday with a group reviewing one facet of an evolving proposal for Office 365 as the primary collaboration and document storage infrastructure for some business operations.

Office 365 in global Financial Services? Yup. Technology pundits-for-sale, tech wannabes, and some who are still intoxicated by their mobile technology have been effective in their efforts to sell “cloud-first.” One outcome of some types of “cloud-enabled” operations is the introduction of mobile client platforms. Even though global Financial Services enterprises tend to hold many hundreds of billions or trillions of other people’s dollars, some sell (even unmanaged) mobile platforms as risk appropriate and within the risk tolerance of all relevant constituencies… My working assumption is that those gigantic piles of assets and the power that can result from them necessarily attract a certain amount of hostile attention. That attention requires that our software, infrastructure, and operations be resistant enough to attack to meet all relevant risk management obligations (contracts, laws, regulations, and more). This scenario seems like a mismatch — but I digress.

So, we were attempting to work through a risk review of Mobile Skype for Business integration. That raised a number of issues, one being the risks associated with the software itself. The mobile application ecosystem is composed of software that executes & stores information locally on mobile devices as well as software running on servers in any number of safe and wildly-unsafe environments. Under most circumstances the Internet is in between. By definition this describes a risk-rich environment.

All hostile parties on earth are also attached to the Internet. As a result, software connected to the Internet must be sufficiently resistant to attack (where “sufficient” is associated with a given business and technology context). Mobile applications are hosted on devices and within operating systems having a relatively short history. I believe that they have tended to prize features and “cool” over effective risk management for much of that history (and many would argue that they continue to do so). As a result, the mobile software ecosystem has a somewhat unique vulnerability profile compared to software hosted in other environments.

The OWASP “Mobile Security Project” team research resulted in the Top 10 mobile vulnerabilities list below. I think it is a useful tool to support those involved in thinking about writing or buying software for that ecosystem. You can use it in a variety of ways. Challenge your vendors to show you evidence (yes, real evidence) that they have dealt with each of these risks. You can do the same with your IT architects or anyone who plays the role of an architect for periods of time — then do it again with your developers and testers later. Business analysts, or those who act as one some of the time should also work through adding these as requirements as needed.  Another way to use this Mobile Top 10 resource is to help you identify and think through the attack surface of an existing or proposed mobile-enabled applications, infrastructure, and operations.

OK, I hope that provides enough context to make use of the resource below.


Mobile Top 10 2016-Top 10

M1 – Improper Platform Usage
This category covers misuse of a platform feature or failure to use platform security controls. It might include Android intents, platform permissions, misuse of TouchID, the Keychain, or some other security control that is part of the mobile operating system. There are several ways that mobile apps can experience this risk.

M2 – Insecure Data Storage  This new category is a combination of M2 + M4 from Mobile Top Ten 2014. This covers insecure data storage and unintended data leakage.

M3 – Insecure Communication This covers poor handshaking, incorrect SSL versions, weak negotiation, cleartext communication of sensitive assets, etc.

M4 – Insecure Authentication This category captures notions of authenticating the end user or bad session management. This can include:
Failing to identify the user at all when that should be required
Failure to maintain the user’s identity when it is required
Weaknesses in session management

M5 – Insufficient Cryptography The code applies cryptography to a sensitive information asset. However, the cryptography is insufficient in some way. Note that anything and everything related to TLS or SSL goes in M3. Also, if the app fails to use cryptography at all when it should, that probably belongs in M2. This category is for issues where cryptography was attempted, but it wasn’t done correctly.

M6 – Insecure Authorization This is a category to capture any failures in authorization (e.g., authorization decisions in the client side, forced browsing, etc.). It is distinct from authentication issues (e.g., device enrolment, user identification, etc.).

If the app does not authenticate users at all in a situation where it should (e.g., granting anonymous access to some resource or service when authenticated and authorized access is required), then that is an authentication failure not an authorization failure.

M7 – Client Code Quality
This was the “Security Decisions Via Untrusted Inputs”, one of our lesser-used categories. This would be the catch-all for code-level implementation problems in the mobile client. That’s distinct from server-side coding mistakes. This would capture things like buffer overflows, format string vulnerabilities, and various other code-level mistakes where the solution is to rewrite some code that’s running on the mobile device.

M8 – Code Tampering
This category covers binary patching, local resource modification, method hooking, method swizzling, and dynamic memory modification.

Once the application is delivered to the mobile device, the code and data resources are resident there. An attacker can either directly modify the code, change the contents of memory dynamically, change or replace the system APIs that the application uses, or modify the application’s data and resources. This can provide the attacker a direct method of subverting the intended use of the software for personal or monetary gain.

M9 – Reverse Engineering
This category includes analysis of the final core binary to determine its source code, libraries, algorithms, and other assets. Software such as IDA Pro, Hopper, otool, and other binary inspection tools give the attacker insight into the inner workings of the application. This may be used to exploit other nascent vulnerabilities in the application, as well as revealing information about back end servers, cryptographic constants and ciphers, and intellectual property.

M10 – Extraneous Functionality Often, developers include hidden backdoor functionality or other internal development security controls that are not intended to be released into a production environment. For example, a developer may accidentally include a password as a comment in a hybrid app. Another example includes disabling of 2-factor authentication during testing.

Protect Your USB

September 19, 2016

Physical and logical PC controls still matter.

Just one more reason to resist the shared madness of “bring your own device” and/or “anywhere/anytime/any-endpoint” in global Financial Services.  We hold trillions of dollars for our customers (under the guise of a broad and evolving range of relationships)!  To add value to those relationships, we turn that money into units that are inter-business (and Internet) friendly to enable complex webs of financial transactions and services.  The concentration of “cash” and its transformation into bits results in an attractive target for hostile parties of many types.  How could endpoint anarchy ever be a risk-appropriate behavior for any but a microscopically few roles within our ranks?  It seems like something we should expect to fail the “reasonable person” test.

I was just catching up on some of my random reading and bumped into this demonstration of Windows credential stealing with just 15 seconds of access to a PC’s USB port.

15 seconds of social engineering is not that hard to pull off, so all you have left are serious controls administering the use of your USB ports, physically destroying your USB ports (yes, that is a serious option), along with multi-layer physical & logical security to the location of the PC at any given time.

Take a look st the video below along with the supporting paper.  Then voice your professional opinion and conscience wherever appropriate to resist elevated risk endpoint behaviors.  And if your role permits, ensure that your Financial Services organization has the goals and resources to effectively deal with attacks like the ones enabled by this automated, USB enabled assault.


15 Second Password Hack, Mr Robot Style
Supporting Paper

Verizon Says Passwords are Not Enough

April 25, 2016

Lately, I’ve been spending a lot of time performing static code security assessments of web applications. That leads to working with developers and those who work around them. One thing many of them share with me is their faith in authentication infrastructure — infrastructure that generally sits “in front” of their applications and protects them from unauthorized users. Sometimes I still hear Architects talk about “security” as if it were really just authentication… In that context, the latest Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR) reviews their 2016 dataset of over 100,000 incidents, including 2,260 confirmed data breaches across 82 countries.

The full paper is worth a read, but in the context of my comments above I wanted to highlight Verizon’s recommendations concerning passwords:

“…passwords are great, kind of like salt. Wonderful as an addition to something else, but you wouldn’t consume it on its own.”

“63% of confirmed data breaches involved weak, default or stolen passwords.”

The top 6 breaches included the following steps: “phish customer > C2 > Drop Keylogger > Export captured data > Use stolen credentials”

“If you are securing a web application, don’t base the integrity of authentication on the assumption that your customers won’t get owned with keylogging malware. They do and will.”

Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR)


Six Months of Cyber-Attacks Against the Financial Services Sector

June 24, 2015

For years, the finance industry has been under attack by groups of hostile parties.

The frequency and sophistication of targeted cyber-attacks is a top-tier risk for our industry.

A threat intelligence vendor, WebSense, recently released a short report outlining their analysis of the actions and attack patterns directed against organizations in the financial services sector. This type of information can be used to help enterprises more effectively protect customers’ data and assets (as well as — for some types — to market their products and services).
This report identifies some key cyber threats and tactics targeting the financial sector, briefly discusses their effectiveness along with the respective volumes of those attack techniques from January through May of this year.

This type of information may be viewed under the category of “forewarned is forearmed.” It can help organizations to construct more proactive resistance to attack, quicker incident detection, and faster responses.

We are enablers & users of global operations that flow trillions of dollars daily.
That, along with the fact that we also host large numbers of personal and identity information, results in our being a continuous focus for hostile agents world-wide — agents who are motivated to constantly optimize their activities.

Financial information and the sensitive personal information of millions of consumers under our care, we must continually strengthen our security practices — our technology, tools and talent — in order to maintain effective (good-enough) defensive and reactive capabilities.

A key message of the WebSense report is that there appears to be no single path to effectively combat threats and risks presented by cyber-security attacks.
Comprehensive, edge-to-edge due diligence is still required.

2015 Industry Drill-Down Report Financial Services” is worth a read, and contains a range of reusable facts & assertions.


“2015 Industry Drill-Down Report Financial Services.”
By Raytheon & WebSense, 06-23-2015.

Predictable Techniques Succeed in Big Bank Theft

February 14, 2015

In a report to be published on Monday, and provided in advance to The New York Times, Kaspersky Lab says it has seen evidence of $300 million (or much more) stolen from more than 100 banks and other financial institutions in Russia, in Japan, the United States, and in at least 27 other nations.

The attack appears to have been initiated via a phishing campaign, followed by long-running surveillance malware, remote access trojans (low and slow), and finally exfiltration of large amounts of money — part via manipulation of bank accounting systems.  …Nothing new there, the story highlights the scale of cyber-crime successes.

The rest of the story will be outlined by Kaspersky on Monday.

Or you can watch a condensed version via YouTube.

This should also be a reminder that there are no security ‘ruby slippers.’  We need to keep rejecting vacuous vendor and pundit preaching about replacing our security perimeters with (pick your hot solution-of-the-moment) ‘the cloud,’ ‘an appliance,’ or some other replacement for common sense, intelligence, and hard work.  Optimizing a layered defense on top of active resistance to phishing (along with all other types of social engineering) and malware remains our primary path to risk-reasonable due diligence.  Announcements of cyber-thefts like the one mentioned above are reminders that there are still tough challenges for all of us in financial services security and risk management.


“Bank Hackers Steal Millions via Malware.”
By David E. Sanger and Nicole Perlroth, 02-14-2015

Updated 02-16-2015:

Report from Kaspersky:
and the full report at (downloaded 02-16-2015 @ 1 PM CST)

Video: “The Great Bank Robbery: Carbanak cybergang steals $1bn from 100 financial institutions worldwide.”

For some context, see:

The Great Bank Heist, or Death by 1,000 Cuts?, By Brian Krebs, 02-15-2015

Mac Boot Hacked via Thunderbolt Port

January 14, 2015

Too many of us still have to deal with members of our workforce who hold groundless beliefs about the freedom from risk they enjoy while using their Macs.

Trammell Hudson described his most recent project at the last Chaos Communication Congress in Germany. It is called Thunderstrike and it can infect any modern Mac boot ROM via the Thunderbolt port — ultimately giving the attacker control of the endpoint. This “evil maid” attack gives us all another reason for concern. Anyone with physical access to a worker’s Mac could use this technique (or one of its predecessors) as a foothold into your network, as well as gaining “direct” access into any operations to which that user has been permitted. Traveling executives seem like obvious targets, but virtually any member of the workforce is a candidate.

Mr. Hudson describes the impact of his attack as:

“There are neither hardware nor software cryptographic checks at boot time of firmware validity, so once the malicious code has been flashed to the ROM, it controls the system from the very first instruction. It could use SMM, virtualization and other techniques to hide from attempts to detect it.

Our proof of concept bootkit also replaces Apple’s public RSA key in the ROM and prevents software attempts to replace it that are not signed by the attacker’s private key. Since the boot ROM is independent of the operating system, reinstallation of OS X will not remove it. Nor does it depend on anything stored on the disk, so replacing the hard drive has no effect.”

At a minimum, this should be used as input for traveler’s security awareness training.

It should also be injected into risk analyses of all BYOD scenarios.

“Thunderstrike.” By Trammell Hudson.

“De Mysteriis Dom Jobsivs: Mac EFI Rootkits.” By Snare (Blackhat 2012)

“Apple’s Mac EFI found vulnerable to bootkit attack via rogue Thunderbolt devices.” By Sam Oliver, Dec 22, 2014

“Thunderstrike: The scary vulnerability in your Mac’s Thunderbolt port.” By Christina Warren, Jan 02, 2015

Macs vulnerable to virtually undetectable virus that “can’t be removed” By Adrian Kingsley-Hughes, Jan 12, 2015

New In-Flight Data Leakage Channel — Gogo.

January 9, 2015

Commercial aircraft WiFi network provider Gogo appears to have been issuing SSL certificates for Google sites accessed via their in-flight service. Technically, the Gogo Inflight Internet service acts as an SSL Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. Most of us in Financial Services are familiar with analogous HTTP proxy infrastructure to allow our organizations to inspect and control web traffic, even traffic to secure web sites.

Assuming that many of your traveling workforce also use and communicate highly sensitive information, the kind that must be controlled to meet regulatory obligations and/or customer & investor expectations, the Gogo service appears to present a potentially material risk management issue. There is also the issue of losing any (more) of your workforce credentials. Under a range of common scenarios, Gogo appears to have them. Does Gogo protect that information to the degree required by Financial Services enterprises?  I assume not.

At a minimum, this seems like another topic to be included in our traveler’s security awareness training.

“Gogo Inflight Internet is intentionally issuing fake SSL certificates.”
BY Dwulf, 01-05-2015

“Gogo Inflight Internet is Intentionally Issuing Fake SSL Certificates.”
By Rick Andrews, 01-07-2015

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